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The likelihood that the 
next human influenza 
pandemic virus will 
emerge from the bird 
influenza virus circu-
lating in Eurasia 
remains unknown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pandemics occur when 
human populations are 
exposed to highly 
transmissible disease 
organisms to which they 
have little or no 
immunity. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The likelihood that the next human influenza pandemic virus will emerge from 
the Asian strain of the H5N1 high pathogenic bird influenza virus that is causing 
widespread outbreaks in Eurasia remains unknown. (See Glossary for italicized terms.)  
Because these bird influenza outbreaks remain primarily an animal disease, there is hope 
that a human pandemic can be prevented.  Eradication of the H5N1 high pathogenic bird 
influenza virus needs to occur at the farm level in the countries where it is currently 
circulating.  Funding of prevention, surveillance, and eradication efforts in the countries 
where outbreaks are occurring or in at-risk countries will provide tools needed to 
facilitate the eradication process of this virus where it is detected and will prevent further 
spread and subsequent economic loss.  Most importantly, stopping the spread of this virus 
will decrease the opportunity for the virus to emerge as the next human pandemic 
influenza virus.  Every new poultry infection, and subsequent human exposure, gives the 
virus an opportunity to adapt directly to humans or to exchange genetic material with 
other influenza viruses, including human influenza subtypes; either event increases the 
chances that the bird influenza will become a significant human disease.  
 
Pandemics 
 
A pandemic is an occurrence of a disease in excess of its anticipated frequency 
that is geographically widespread (perhaps globally).  Essentially, a pandemic is an 
epidemic with a much broader geographic distribution.  Pandemics occur when human 
populations are exposed to highly transmissible disease organisms to which they have 
little or no immunity.  This exposure can result in infections, which result in disease.  The 
organism then escapes the infected human and is transmitted to the next susceptible 
human.  Because the human population is immunologically naïve, every person exposed  
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Influenza A viruses 
have caused several 
pandemics in humans 
throughout history. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Influenza A viruses 
change, or drift, 
frequently. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to the organism is potentially susceptible and may become infected.  This process can 
result in rapid spread of the disease within a population and subsequent spread to distant 
populations.  Pandemics generally spread worldwide within 1 to 3 years.  As long as 
susceptible humans continue to come into contact with the infectious organism, the 
disease continues to spread.  This cycle stops only when large portions of the population 
become immune to the infection and are no longer shedding the organism in large 
numbers.  Immunity occurs when people become infected, recover from the disease, and 
have circulating antibodies to protect them from future disease. 
 
 
Influenza A Viruses 
 
Influenza viruses are identified by proteins that are unique to their virus “type” 
and “subtype.”  The type designation comes from two internal proteins, known as the 
nucleoprotein and matrix proteins and includes the type A, B, and C influenza viruses.  
Type A influenza viruses are the most common, and infections have been reported in 
mammals such as swine, horses, cats, dogs, marine mammals, mink, and humans, as well 
as in birds.  Influenza A viruses have caused several pandemics in humans throughout 
history; type B and C influenza viruses also commonly cause human disease, but disease 
outbreaks generally are limited in size.  Influenza A viruses are characterized further 
according to the antigenic characteristics of two surface proteins known as hemagglutinin 
(H) and neuraminidase (N), resulting in a subtype designation.  There are 16 H subtypes 
and 9 N subtypes currently identified, resulting in 144 different possible combinations of 
H and N subtypes among the influenza A viruses.  The unique segmented structure of the 
genetic material in influenza A viruses makes them inherently unstable and subject to 
genetic change (Swayne and Halvorson 2003). 
 
Humans are commonly infected with H1, H2, and H3 subtypes of influenza A 
viruses.  Viruses of the H5 and H7 subtype are of the most concern to agriculture because 
some strains have historically caused severe disease in poultry.  Because most influenza 
A viruses are relatively host specific, human influenza viruses generally do not infect 
birds and bird viruses generally do not infect humans.  Certain influenza A viruses, 
however, have exhibited an unusual ability to infect more than one host species.  When 
influenza A viruses from two host species co-infect the same animal, the viruses have the 
opportunity to exchange genetic material that codes for the internal and surface proteins, 
a process known as antigenic shift.  This exchange could result in an emerging virus with 
a new or expanded host range.  As a result, the new virus could infect host species that 
have never been susceptible before and also could cause a change in the ability of the 
virus to cause severe illness (Perdue and Swayne 2005).  This type of change in a virus 
capable of spreading among humans could produce a pandemic. 
 
Although some pathogenic organisms remain unchanged for many years and can 
be controlled with vaccines that protect the recipient for a lifetime, influenza A vaccines 
do not fit into this category.  The influenza A viruses accumulate point mutations 
resulting in sequential minor changes in the dominant circulating strains.  This process is 
known as antigenic drift.  Therefore, the influenza vaccine is evaluated yearly and 
changed frequently to protect against new and emerging strains of influenza A viruses.  
This is why people in high-risk groups are encouraged to be vaccinated with updated 
influenza A vaccines every year.   
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shorebirds. 
 
 
 
Highly pathogenic 
avian influenza viruses 
are considered to be 
foreign animal diseases 
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The subtle changes seen from year to year in influenza viruses generally do not 
lead to widespread severe disease, but they do make it unfeasible to stockpile large 
quantities of vaccine for periods longer than 1 to 2 years.  Subtle changes in influenza 
viruses can render vaccines less effective with time.  Sudden major changes can render 
vaccines totally ineffective. 
 
 
Historical Pandemics 
 
There were three influenza A pandemics in the twentieth century.  The influenza 
pandemic of 1918 was the deadliest.  This pandemic may have began in the United States 
as an epidemic that was confined largely to military bases and prisons.  Public health 
officials were not overly concerned with the disease because infections tend to spread 
rapidly among people living in crowded conditions.  When American troops took the 
virus to Europe during World War I, it quickly became established in Europe and spread 
to Russia, North Africa, India, China, Japan, the Philippines, Brazil, and New Zealand.  
American troops returning home brought the virus back to the United States and it spread 
into the civilian population.  Almost 700,000 people died from influenza in the United 
States alone, and 20 to 50 million people died worldwide.  Two additional influenza A 
pandemics have occurred since 1918:  the “Asian flu” that resulted in one to two million 
deaths in 1957–58, and the “Hong Kong flu” that resulted in approximately one million 
deaths in 1968–69 (Carver 2005).  Each pandemic introduced a new subtype of influenza 
A virus into the human population.  Because people had no immunity to the new 
subtypes, infection rates were very high, resulting in the spread of the viruses around the 
world within 1 year of detection.  All three pandemics were traced to viruses that 
originated in birds and could be considered to be zoonotic diseases, that is, diseases that 
originate as an animal disease, but also are capable of causing disease in humans. 
 
Avian Influenza 
 
All known subtypes of influenza A viruses have been recovered from birds living 
in an aquatic environment, and these birds are considered to be the natural reservoir.  
Avian influenza (AI) viruses are carried asymptomatically by ducks, geese, and 
shorebirds; they typically do not exhibit any signs of disease.  These bird species are the 
perfect disseminators of influenza A viruses worldwide because they migrate for long 
distances, spreading viruses through contaminated feces. 
 
Pathogenicity is a measure of the degree of illness that AI viruses cause in 
chickens.  By the current definition from the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) in 
France, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses cause death in at least six of 
eight experimentally infected chickens.  In addition, if the genetic sequence of the AI 
virus in question is similar to that observed for other HPAI strains, then the virus must be 
considered to be highly pathogenic, whether or not it causes overt disease.  All other AI 
viruses are considered to be of low pathogenicity (LPAI) (Swayne and Halvorson 2003).  
This definition of the ability of these viruses to make chickens sick does not apply to 
humans or human infections with AI viruses.  The HPAI viruses are considered to be 
foreign animal diseases (FADs) in the United States, meaning that they do not normally 
occur here and they are required to be reported to the state veterinarian’s office and to the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture–Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA– 
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APHIS) immediately after detection.  To date, all recorded HPAI viruses have been of the 
H5 or H7 subtypes.  The LPAI viruses are endemic to the United States, exist in wild 
waterfowl and live-bird market reservoirs, and occasionally infect commercial poultry 
flocks.  The LPAI viruses of the H5 and H7 subtypes also are reportable to state 
authorities because of their historical ability to mutate to the highly pathogenic form.  
High pathogenic AI infections cause severe economic losses to affected poultry 
producers and are, therefore, considered an emergency disease requiring immediate 
eradication efforts. 
 
Surveillance systems currently are in place in the United States that focus on 
detecting AI viruses in poultry.  Detection and rapid response are key elements of the 
U.S. AI control program.  The National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP), a program of 
USDA–APHIS in cooperation with the poultry industry, monitors breeder birds (parents) 
of commercial egg-type chickens, meat-type chickens, and meat-type turkeys for the 
presence of antibody to AI viruses.  The NPIP currently is establishing a monitoring 
program for table egg chickens, meat-type chickens, and meat-type turkeys.  The NPIP 
program tested 390,000 AI samples from commercial poultry in 2003 to assure the U.S. 
poultry industry and their trading partners that poultry products in the United States are 
free of AI.  In addition, many state diagnostic laboratories routinely test backyard and 
commercial birds presented with respiratory disease signs for the presence of AI.  For 
example, the state of North Carolina tested almost 200,000 birds in 2004 and Georgia 
tested 100,000 birds in 2003. The USDA–APHIS is developing an AI monitoring 
program for the live-bird market system in the northeastern United States. 
  
This early detection must be complemented with rapid and complete containment 
plans.  Avian influenza outbreaks involving low pathogenic strains of the H5 and H7 
subtype generally are handled at the state level.  Plans to eradicate H5 and H7 strains in 
poultry flocks have been developed in most poultry-producing states.  These plans are 
widely disseminated and are activated immediately upon detection of one of these strains.  
These procedures allow poultry producers to protect their investments by quickly 
eradicating an influenza virus before it becomes highly pathogenic.   
 
 
Human Cases of Avian Influenza 
 
In recent years, there were fewer than 100 reported human deaths worldwide 
associated with AI.  Most of these deaths were attributed to the Asian HPAI (H5N1) virus 
that is circulating in parts of (Eurasian) Asia.  Most human deaths attributed to Asian 
HPAI (H5N1) have occurred in Asian countries (Sims et al. 2005).   It seems that the 
virus has spread beyond Asia as migratory waterfowl move to winter nesting grounds or 
through the movement of infected domestic fowl, but only a small number of human 
cases have been reported outside of Asia.  The farming practices and culinary customs 
unique to Asia are believed to be associated with the transmission of AI viruses from 
birds to humans.  In most of the human cases of Asian HPAI (H5N1), there was close 
contact with infected live or recently dead birds.  There have been no human cases of 
Asian HPAI (H5N1) associated with eating properly cooked poultry meat or eggs.  The 
Asian HPAI (H5N1) virus strain infecting humans can cause severe disease and death 
partly because humans have little to no immunity to the H5 subtype viruses.  There have 
been fewer than 200 documented human cases of Asian HPAI (H5N1) resulting in fewer 
than 100 deaths during an 8-year period despite the probable exposure of millions of  
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people in these countries, making the transmission of the virus from birds to humans rare.  
Human-to-human transmission of Asian HPAI (H5N1) has been limited and sustained 
human-to-human transmission has not been documented; however, each additional 
human case increases the chance that the virus eventually will improve its transmissibility 
in humans.  The emergence of an Asian HPAI (H5N1) virus strain that is transmitted 
readily among humans could result in the start of a new pandemic. 
 
 
Pandemic Risk Assessment 
 
Asian HPAI (H5N1) remains primarily an animal disease.  It is not easily 
transmitted from birds to humans and human-to-human transmission has not been shown 
to be sustained.  The relatively few confirmed human deaths that have occurred 
worldwide reflect how rare this virus infection is in humans.  During the 8-year period 
cited previously, approximately 288,000 Americans died from human influenza.  
Currently, the risk of humans contracting Asian HPAI (H5N1) is extremely low. 
 
The spread of Asian HPAI (H5N1) to poultry in additional countries is likely 
during waterfowl migration, through trade in the live-bird markets, and through the 
movement of infected domestic fowl, especially ducks.  Heightened surveillance for 
waterfowl die-offs and outbreaks in poultry flocks is needed to quickly identify virus 
spread and to initiate response programs.  Because the Asian HPAI (H5N1) virus is 
highly pathogenic in most poultry species and some wild birds, disease detection should 
not be difficult in most cases, provided adequate diagnostic capability is available.  
Domestic ducks, however, have been shown to be asymptomatic carriers of the virus and 
may serve as a silent reservoir for the disease.  Heightened efforts to detect influenza 
viruses in asymptomatic birds are important to ensure early detection and eradication.  
Rapid depopulation and destruction of infected flocks followed by thorough cleaning and 
disinfection are essential in ensuring that Asian HPAI (H5N1) remains an animal disease 
and is eventually eradicated altogether.  Intensified testing of flocks in close proximity to 
known positive flocks could prevent asymptomatic flocks from moving to processing or 
to other markets.  Unfortunately, many at-risk countries in Eurasia, the Middle East, and 
Africa lack the necessary diagnostic and animal health infrastructure to adequately carry 
out surveillance for the presence of Asian HPAI (H5N1) and will require significant 
financial help from the more developed countries. 
 
Introduction of Asian HPAI (H5N1) to the United States could occur via infected 
birds or infected humans. Because the United States does not import live birds or poultry 
products from countries where the Asian HPAI (H5N1) has been reported, the most likely 
bird source for Asian HPAI (H5N1) would be migratory waterfowl or illegally smuggled 
birds.  Birds migrating into and out of the Asian HPAI (H5N1) endemic areas are not 
likely to be an issue in the United States until spring migration and the return of birds to 
summer nesting grounds.  The eastern-most flyways for migratory birds in Asia do 
include the Arctic and Alaska, although no positive birds have been detected there to 
date.  Increased surveillance along these flyways could facilitate early detection if Asian 
HPAI (H5N1) were to be introduced.  No major poultry-producing regions exist in the 
Arctic or in Alaska, but the west coast of Canada and of the United States (Washington, 
Oregon, and California) are potentially at risk. 
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Heightened human surveillance for signs of severe respiratory disease should be 
implemented, especially for those people traveling to or from endemic areas or those 
living there.  Reporting of human cases of respiratory diseases and more intensive testing 
for influenza A viruses could provide early detection in the unlikely event that human 
infections occur. 
 
Different farming systems are associated with the differing risks of both bird 
infection and human infection.  Birds grown in modern enclosed housing are at a much 
lower risk of contracting AI from wild birds than are birds raised outside.  Modern U.S. 
farm production practices provide for more control over the movement of poultry and 
allow for the implementation of strict biosecurity procedures designed to prevent the 
introduction of disease agents to domestic flocks.  In addition, commercial poultry raised 
in integrated agricultural systems typically are grown on farms dedicated to a specific 
processing plant and are not sold or commingled in livestock markets.  Effective 
surveillance systems and veterinary oversight help decrease the risk of spreading AI 
viruses in commercial poultry in this country.  This modern type of poultry production is 
more protective of birds and their health than traditional agricultural systems in which 
birds are raised in small flocks outside, a system that is commonly found in countries in 
the developing world.  The spread of Asian HPAI (H5N1) in Southeast Asia is mostly 
occurring in small villages where poultry, especially domestic ducks, are raised in open 
air fields with exposure to wild migratory birds and then sold live in village markets 
(Sims et al. 2005).  This practice promotes the maintenance of the virus reservoir in 
domestic ducks and leads to recurring infections. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The Asian HPAI (H5N1) remains primarily an animal agriculture disease today.  
Eradication of this disease needs to occur at the farm level in the countries where it is 
currently circulating.  Adequate federal funding of prevention, surveillance, and 
eradication efforts in Asia and in the at-risk countries outside of Asia not only will 
facilitate the eradication process if this virus is detected but also will prevent further 
spread and subsequent economic loss to the affected country and decrease the opportunity 
for the virus to adapt to humans.  Every new poultry infection, and subsequent human 
exposure, gives this virus an opportunity to exchange genetic material with other 
influenza viruses, including human influenza subtypes, and increases the chances that 
Asian HPAI (H5N1) will become a significant human disease.  Education of U.S. citizens 
about the relatively low risk of becoming infected with Asian HPAI (H5N1) virus is 
needed to calm the fears of a pandemic created by the almost constant media publicity on 
this issue. 
 
 
GLOSSARY 
 
Antigenic.  Having the properties of a substance that induces a specific immune response; usually resulting in the   
production of antibodies that prevent future disease from specific organisms. 
Antigenic drift.  Small, gradual changes in the genetic make-up of the virus resulting from errors in copying the genetic 
material. 
CAST Commentary Avian Influenza:  Human Pandemic Concerns 7
Antigenic shift.  Wholesale changes in the genetic make-up of the virus resulting from the exchange of gene segments 
between different viruses. 
Asymptomatic.  Without clinical signs or symptoms. 
Endemic.  The usual presence of a disease or infection. 
Epidemic.  An occurrence of disease in excess of its anticipated frequency. 
Pandemic.  A geographically widespread epidemic usually spreading worldwide in 1 to 3 years. 
Pathogenic.  Having the ability to produce disease. 
Zoonotic.  Having the ability to infect both animals and humans. 
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